ADDIS ABABA — In September 2026, when seven Ethiopian armed groups announced the formation of an “Alliance for Survival” in Addis Ababa, the expected euphoria did not materialize within Oromo political circles. Instead, it triggered a profound reckoning.

A widely circulated reflection text attributed to the Oromo political commentator Abbaa Gammachiis — titled “Political Survival or Self-Destruction?” — has become a focal point of that reckoning. Its central question is as blunt as it is uncomfortable: Is the alliance between the Oromo Liberation Army (WBO/OLA) and the Amhara Fano militia a strategic choice in service of Oromo liberation, or a cynical maneuver by organizational leaderships seeking to preserve their own political relevance?

The timing of this reflection is no accident. On September 20, Fano leader Zemene Kassie announced on Tigray TV that seven armed organizations — including the WBO, Fano, and the TPLF — had formed a coordinated front aimed at removing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government from power. Yet within Oromo communities, the declaration was met not with celebration but with deep suspicion.

A Fundamental Contradiction

Abbaa Gammachiis’s reflection rests on a premise stated and restated throughout: the goal of the Oromo liberation struggle is not to replace one occupant of Menelik Palace with another. It is to achieve self-determination, political freedom, and the genuine restoration of Oromo territorial sovereignty.

“If the only goal were to topple Abiy’s government, then allying with any force could be understandable,” the text argues. “But what happens after? Who guarantees Oromo self-rule? Who ensures that Oromos in Wallagga and Shawa are no longer attacked by Fano?”

This concern has a concrete empirical basis. According to multiple reports, Fano forces have been active in western Wallagga and northern Shawa, where Oromo communities have repeatedly reported attacks, abductions, and property destruction. A European Union Agency for Asylum report from October 2025 documented direct clashes between Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army in the Dera area; a June 2024 skirmish left four civilians dead.

The WBO itself has not been unaware of this. On September 17, 2026 — just three days before the alliance was announced — the WBO issued a statement explicitly demanding that Amhara armed forces “distance themselves from the Wallagga faction,” warning that “association with this small armed faction could carry political consequences.” Three days later, the WBO appeared alongside Fano in the “Alliance for Survival.”

The Gap Between Narrative and Reality

A BBC Amharic and Oromo investigation from August 2025 revealed deeper contradictions. At that time, the outlet “Africa Intelligence” first reported that the WBO and Fano had allegedly reached a ceasefire agreement. But WBO senior commander Jireenyaa Guddataa explicitly denied it to the BBC: “No negotiations ever took place between the WBO and Fano prisoners.” He went further, characterizing Fano’s presence in Oromo areas as that of an enemy: “Fano entered Oromo territory, displaced our people, and the WBO regards it as an enemy.”

Fano denied any agreement as well. Fano National Movement spokesperson Geetaa Asraddaa stated that “no direct or indirect talks, relations, or agreements exist with the WBO.”

A year later, that “nonexistent relationship” was publicly unveiled as a formal alliance. For Oromos paying attention, the shift raises serious questions about decision-making transparency and internal democracy.

A “Cursed Alliance”

Not all WBO-affiliated voices have accepted the pivot. In March 2026, a group claiming to represent “WBO Foreign Affairs” issued a scathing statement branding any alliance with Fano a “cursed alliance.”

The statement leveled several accusations: that the leadership had “abandoned the political program and charter published in 2017,” “chosen to side with Fano and other enemies of the Oromo liberation struggle,” and “chosen closeness with Fano over the defense of Oromos while Oromos are being ethnically cleansed by Fano.”

It concluded: “We call on the Oromo people and the WBO not to choose between two enemies, but to intensify the struggle on both fronts — against Prosperity and against Fano.”

Whether this statement represents a significant internal faction or a minority dissent is difficult to independently verify. But its very existence signals that the Fano alliance is far from a consensus position within the WBO.

The Logic of “Political Survival”

Abbaa Gammachiis’s text ultimately directs its critique toward a more sensitive target: the “political survival” motives of organizational leadership.

The logic is as follows: when an armed organization lacks military breakthroughs or political progress over an extended period, the legitimacy of its leadership gradually erodes. An alliance with another armed force — even one unpopular among the grassroots — can provide leadership with a narrative of “action,” sustain the interest of external funders, and defer internal questions about strategic direction.

“The question is: is this alliance serving the goal of Oromo liberation, or is it serving the survival of the organization and its current leadership?” the text asks.

The sharpness of this critique lies in its refusal to rely on speculation about individual motives. Instead, it points to a structural dilemma: when an armed organization’s decision-making is characterized by information asymmetry with the population it claims to represent, the leadership’s behavioral logic can gradually drift from its proclaimed goals.

Where Are the People?

A recurring theme in Abbaa Gammachiis’s analysis is the “absence of the people.” The text stresses that a strategic pivot of this magnitude — allying with former enemies — should have been thoroughly debated among the Oromo public and WBO’s grassroots membership.

“The WBO is not composed solely of armed fighters,” the text states. “It is built on the foundation of the entire Oromo people — youth, scholars, the diaspora, political parties. To make such a consequential political decision without consulting them is itself a serious problem.”

This critique also touches on a broader dilemma in Oromo politics. Since Abiy’s rise in 2018, Oromo political forces have undergone severe fragmentation and realignment. From the Qeerroo youth movement that propelled Abiy to power, to subsequent disillusionment with Prosperity Party’s centralizing tendencies, to the WBO’s years-long armed struggle in the bush, Oromo political choices have oscillated and struggled among multiple forces.

Against this backdrop, a WBO–Fano alliance — with Fano widely viewed in western Oromo areas as an attacking force against Oromo communities — may deepen Oromo political alienation. If the largest Oromo armed organization chooses to cooperate with what Oromo communities perceive as an enemy, the narrative of “liberation” faces a serious credibility crisis.

What Comes Next?

As of press time, the future trajectory of the “Alliance for Survival” remains uncertain. Analysts broadly note that internal ideological and strategic divisions — particularly the fundamental contradiction between the WBO and Fano over western Oromo territory and community security — may cause it to fracture in the near term.

WBO commander Jaal Marroo told local media in early September that the organizations had “met multiple times” before the eventual announcement. But the frequency of meetings does not conceal substantive disagreements.

Abbaa Gammachiis’s reflection offers no simple answers. It returns instead to a basic question: “Is this alliance for Oromo liberation, or for the survival of the organization and its current leadership? The answer will profoundly shape the Oromo people and the future of their struggle.”

For many Oromos, the fact that this question must even be asked is itself part of the answer.