Human Rights in Oromia: Past, Present, and Future

A Legacy of Struggle, Ongoing Crisis, and the Uncertain Path Toward Justice

OROMIA, Ethiopia — The human rights situation in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest and most populous regional state, represents one of the most complex and challenging human rights landscapes in Africa today. From the conquest and incorporation of Oromo lands into the Ethiopian empire in the late nineteenth century to the ongoing armed conflict between government forces and Oromo liberation movements, the Oromo people have experienced cycles of repression, resistance, and unfulfilled aspirations for self-determination .

This feature examines the trajectory of human rights in Oromia across three temporal dimensions: the historical context that shaped current realities, the present crisis unfolding across the region, and the uncertain future as Ethiopia approaches critical elections in 2026 while grappling with demands for justice, accountability, and meaningful self-governance.

PART ONE: THE PAST — Conquest, Assimilation, and Resistance

The Foundations of Oppression: Menelik’s Conquest and Imperial Rule

The modern human rights predicament of the Oromo people traces directly to the military conquest and incorporation of their lands into the Ethiopian empire during the final decades of the nineteenth century . Under Emperor Menelik II, Oromia—a vast territory stretching across what is now central, eastern, and southern Ethiopia—was forcibly absorbed through military campaigns that scholar Mohammed Hassen describes as inflicting “brutality and depredations” upon the Oromo population .

The Imperial government maintained control through a highly repressive system that granted power at the local level to armed, non-Oromo settlers known as neftegna (literally “riflemen”) . This system of governance, which persisted through the reign of Haile Selassie, subjected Oromo communities to land expropriation, cultural suppression, and political marginalization.

Cultural oppression was central to imperial policy. The rulers in Addis Ababa adopted systematic measures to suppress Oromo culture, including severe restrictions on the use and development of Afaan Oromo, the Oromo language . As one Human Rights Watch report notes, because the Oromo constituted such a large proportion of the Ethiopian population, “Imperial authorities treated any expression of Oromo national consciousness as a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the empire and the continued dominance of its ruling Amhara elite” . Many Oromo regard their absorption into the Ethiopian state as a form of colonial conquest .

The Derg Era: Brutality Continues Under Military Dictatorship

The overthrow of Haile Selassie by the military in 1974 brought no respite for the Oromo. The Derg—the committee of military officers who seized control—”quickly evolved into an extremely brutal dictatorship that continued the oppression of the Oromo” . Under Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime, Oromia remained a site of military repression, forced villagization programs, and continued denial of political and cultural rights.

It was during this period that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had its origins in an armed struggle against the Haile Selassie government in the 1960s, consolidated its position as “the leading voice of Oromo nationalism” . By 1991, when the Derg collapsed, the OLF enjoyed widespread popular support throughout much of Oromia and had established longstanding ties to Oromo civil society .

The EPRDF Era: Ethnic Federalism and Its Contradictions

The fall of the Derg in 1991 brought dramatic political changes. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-controlled Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition seized power and introduced a new constitution in 1994 that divided Ethiopia into regions drawn roughly along ethnic lines . For the first time in Ethiopian history, Oromia was established as a recognized territorial unit—the largest region in the federation, surrounding the capital Addis Ababa and home to millions of Oromo .

However, this formal recognition masked a deeper political reality. The TPLF created the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) in 1990, outside of Oromia and “without any grassroots political participation” . The OPDO began with little popular support, its only assets being complete backing from the TPLF and hope that Oromos would rally behind the EPRDF flag .

When the OLF joined the TPLF-led transitional government in 1991, tensions quickly emerged. In the run-up to national elections scheduled for June 1992, violence and harassment marred campaigning. After becoming convinced it would not be allowed to compete fairly, the OLF withdrew from the race, leading to open conflict. EPRDF military forces captured thousands of OLF fighters within weeks and drove the OLF administration from its stronghold in Dembi Dollo .

This moment proved decisive. As Human Rights Watch documented, after the OLF’s departure, “no other substantial party emerged in Oromia to challenge the OPDO,” which subsequently established a “near-total monopoly on political power in Oromia since 1992” . Yet despite its military defeat, “the OLF has retained its status as the most potent symbol of Oromo nationalism and continues in many ways to be the central focus of political discourse in Oromia” .

Systematic Repression Under EPRDF Rule

The period from 1992 through 2018 witnessed systematic human rights violations in Oromia. Security forces imprisoned thousands of Oromo on charges of plotting armed insurrection for the OLF, accusations that “have regularly been used as a transparent pretext to imprison individuals who publicly question government policies or actions” . Detainees were subjected to torture and continuing harassment after release—abuses that often destroyed victims’ ability to earn livelihoods and isolated them from their communities .

Students faced particular scrutiny. Between 2000 and 2004, Oromo students demonstrated in towns throughout the region to protest government policies. Police put down demonstrations with unnecessary force, and regional authorities responded by subjecting students to “persistent and intrusive surveillance, both in and out of the classroom” . Teachers were required to gather information about students on pain of transfer to remote postings, and students labeled as subversives faced imprisonment, torture, or expulsion .

In rural areas, where more than eighty-five percent of Oromia’s population resides, authorities created new quasi-governmental structures called gott and garee that monitored and controlled the activities, speech, and movement of the rural population down to individual households . Though officials claimed these were voluntary associations for development work, farmers told Human Rights Watch that authorities imposed these structures on communities and that the garee regularly required forced labor on projects they had no hand in designing . More disturbingly, authorities used these structures to monitor speech, restrict movement, and enforce attendance at thinly disguised OPDO political rallies .

As one Human Rights Watch report concluded, “This backdrop of oppression must be factored into any assessment of the upcoming elections” . The pervasive pattern of repression ensured that for most of Oromia’s population, voting remained “a hollow exercise” .

PART TWO: THE PRESENT — Ongoing Crisis and Escalating Violence

The Abiy Era: Hope and Disillusionment

The ascension of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 initially raised hopes among Oromo nationalists. Abiy, himself Oromo, came to power on the wave of mass protests that had swept Oromia beginning in 2015—protests in which thousands of activists lost their lives . Many Oromo hoped his administration would finally address their long-standing demands for genuine autonomy, language rights, and equitable benefits from Addis Ababa .

However, those hopes have largely dissipated. According to Africa Confidential, “Protests in Oromia against Abiy’s leadership began months ago, although anger had been building for two years as demands for genuine autonomy, greater language rights, and more benefits from Addis Ababa were ignored by the federal government” .

Critics accuse Abiy of “repressing civil rights and stifling the opposition in a manner little different from the EPRDF, and not allowing sufficient freedom to ethno-nationalist forces” . Many opposition supporters in Oromia believe Abiy’s government is “shifting towards a modern version of the pre-1974 imperial system when the Amhara language, culture, and elite predominated” .

The OLA Insurgency and Government Counterinsurgency

Since 2018, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)—a breakaway faction of the OLF—has been battling Ethiopia’s government, even if at times the rebellion was overshadowed by the 2020-2022 war in Tigray . The conflict has produced devastating human rights abuses by both sides.

The OLA, led by rebel commander Jaal Marroo from forest outposts in Oromia, claims it is “fighting to correct a system that treats the Oromo as subjects, rather than citizens” and aims to “establish a democratic, inclusive political order based on the will of the people” . The government has designated the group as terrorist, accusing it of massacring civilians in ethnically motivated attacks .

United Nations investigators have accused the OLA of serious abuses including killings, rapes, and kidnappings . Sarah Kimani, a regional spokesperson for Amnesty International, told the Associated Press that research “puts both the OLA and the government forces in the middle of the conflict in terms of summary executions, in terms of torture, in terms of abductions, in terms of rape of women” .

Government forces have also committed widespread violations. According to the same investigation, “indiscriminate drone strikes, extrajudicial killings and disappearances have become a hallmark of their counterinsurgency campaign” . Civilians describe being caught between the two sides, suffering from both.

Ayantu Bulcha, whose father and uncle were killed by soldiers outside their home in early December after being accused of fighting with the OLA, described her terror: “My frail mother is left alone in an empty house, grieving. I can’t even go there to grieve with her. I am afraid for my own safety” .

Current Human Rights Situation: Detentions, Disappearances, and Displacement

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, in its annual report presented in August 2025, highlighted severe concerns in Oromia and Amhara regions . According to the report, arbitrary detentions in these regions, plagued by armed conflict for several years, are “legion” . Kidnappings of civilians, organized by both armed groups and federal forces, have multiplied, with captors demanding ransoms for hostages’ release. Mizanie Abate, in charge of human rights monitoring for the Commission, stated that “many hostages, unable to pay, have been victims of torture, or even assassinated” .

A joint statement by 42 countries at the UN Human Rights Council in September 2025 expressed continued alarm at “the high number of human rights violations and abuses by both state and non-state actors” in Ethiopia, including in Oromia . The statement noted “grave concern” at the “significant increase in grave violations against children, including the killing and maiming of children, sexual violence against children and the abduction of children” .

The humanitarian situation has deteriorated dramatically. In January 2025, the UN reported that 3.2 million children were out of school because of fighting in Oromia . In Wollega district, aid groups struggle to distribute supplies, contributing to high malnutrition. Hospitals and clinics have come under attack; in 2023, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that “nearly all” of 42 health posts in Oromia’s Begi district had been looted or damaged .

Insecurity Beyond the Conflict

The crisis extends beyond the direct conflict. “Oromia is very insecure, not simply because of the OLA but because of other groups operating as criminal enterprises, engaging in extortion, kidnapping and robberies,” said Magnus Taylor, Horn of Africa director at the International Crisis Group .

Lensa Hordofa, a civil servant from Oromia’s Shewa region, described how her family faces constant harassment and extortion from armed men, including demands for food and supplies. Her uncle was recently detained and released only after paying a 100,000 birr ($650) ransom. “Movement from place to place has become increasingly restricted,” she said. “It’s almost impossible to travel” .

Tulu Getachew, a coffee farmer from Wollega, has been unable to return home for three years. After hiring workers to collect his beans, the harvest was stolen by armed men. His explanation captures the impossible position of civilians: “One party hurts you because they say you belong to the other. You suffer because they say your family member is affiliated with the government or OLA” .

International Concerns and Civic Space

The international community has expressed serious concerns about shrinking civic space in Ethiopia ahead of 2026 elections. The joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council noted “regret” at “the closure of civic space in Ethiopia, including recent intimidation and suspension of civil society organisations as well as intimidation of independent media and journalists” .

Human Rights Watch has denounced impending reforms to Ethiopia’s civil society law, warning that amendments could facilitate suspension of associations by the Ethiopian Authority for Civil Society Organizations . As elections approach, Mizanie Abate of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said they are “watching the situation closely,” adding: “This reform must in no way hinder the activities of associations. We do not want a return to the past” .

PART THREE: THE FUTURE — Elections, Transitional Justice, and the Path Forward

The 2026 Elections: A Critical Test

With national elections scheduled for 2026, Ethiopia faces a critical test of its commitment to democratic processes and human rights. The elections will occur against a backdrop of ongoing conflict in Oromia and Amhara, unresolved political tensions, and deep distrust between the federal government and opposition forces .

The international community has signaled that it will be watching closely. The joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council noted concern about “constraints on the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association less than a year before the elections in 2026” . Whether these elections will offer Oromo voters genuine choice, or merely repeat the hollow exercises documented by Human Rights Watch in 2005, remains an open question.

Transitional Justice: Unfulfilled Promises

A key element of Ethiopia’s future human rights landscape is the transitional justice process. Despite government commitments, the joint statement expressed concern about “lack of progress with the Transitional Justice process,” recalling that “implementing credible transitional justice and accountability processes is not only crucial for the victims and survivors, but also to ensuring lasting peace and reconciliation in the country” .

The international community called on Ethiopia to “demonstrate its commitment by ensuring a comprehensive, victim-centred and inclusive approach to transitional justice and to take immediate decisive steps to ensure accountability for all human rights violations and abuses” . This includes implementing recommendations from the 2023 joint report of OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and adopting transitional justice laws consistent with international human rights standards .

The Promise and Peril of Customary Justice

One area of potential progress is the development of customary justice mechanisms. The Oromia regional state has established over 7,376 customary courts, which since 2023 have handled over 1,133,374 cases . These courts, rooted in indigenous systems that predate the formal judiciary, offer accessible, affordable, and culturally legitimate justice for millions .

However, the system faces significant challenges. Assessments show “persistent human rights violations, gender-based exclusion and political interference” . Female elders are often unwelcome. Local administrators interfere in proceedings. And many courts handle matters that should go through the formal justice system .

Crucially, the oversight mechanisms envisioned in law have not been established. Customary Courts Administration Councils, designed to monitor compliance and organize capacity building, remain unrealized. As a result, “the entire customary justice system is currently unwatched, with limited accountability and no structured channel for community feedback or rights protection” .

For the future of human rights in Oromia, ensuring these courts operate in accordance with constitutional and international standards—providing justice while preventing discrimination—represents both an opportunity and a challenge.

Paths Forward: What Would Change Require?

Any meaningful improvement in Oromia’s human rights situation would require multiple interconnected elements:

Ending the Armed Conflict: As long as government forces and the OLA continue fighting, civilians will remain trapped between the two sides, suffering killings, displacement, and destruction. The joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council called on “all parties to refrain from further violations and abuses and to engage in peaceful dialogue and negotiations to restore peace” .

Accountability for Past Abuses: Decades of human rights violations, from the imperial era through the Derg and EPRDF periods to the present, remain unaddressed. Victims have received neither justice nor reparations. A credible transitional justice process must include meaningful consultation with victims, women, youth, minorities, and civil society .

Genuine Political Competition: The pattern of one-party dominance in Oromia, maintained through repression rather than popular support, must end. As Human Rights Watch documented in 2005, “the political freedoms required for elections to be a meaningful exercise of Ethiopian citizens’ fundamental right to participate in the selection of their government do not exist for many Ethiopians” . Changing this requires dismantling the mechanisms of control and allowing genuine political competition.

Respect for Fundamental Freedoms: Ending arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of perceived critics; allowing free expression and assembly; permitting independent media and civil society to operate without intimidation—these basics of democratic governance remain aspirations rather than realities for many Oromos .

Addressing Root Causes: Ultimately, the human rights crisis in Oromia stems from unresolved questions about the relationship between the Oromo people and the Ethiopian state. As scholar Asafa Jalata argues, the failure of successive regimes to address “the class and nation-class contradictions manifested in the continuing crisis of the Ethiopian state” has perpetuated cycles of conflict and repression . Whether Ethiopia can evolve into a genuinely democratic, inclusive state that respects the rights of all its peoples—including the Oromo—remains the fundamental question.

Conclusion: The Weight of History, The Possibility of Change

The human rights situation in Oromia cannot be understood without appreciating the weight of history. From the nineteenth-century conquest through imperial rule, the Derg’s brutality, the EPRDF’s repressive dominance, and now the ongoing conflict under Abiy’s government, Oromos have experienced more than a century of systematic marginalization, cultural suppression, and violent repression.

Yet history also reveals the resilience of Oromo identity and the persistence of the struggle for self-determination. Despite military defeat in 1992 and decades of surveillance, imprisonment, and torture, Oromo nationalism has not only survived but has repeatedly reemerged—in student protests, in the mass demonstrations of 2015-2018, and in the ongoing resistance represented by the OLA.

The future remains deeply uncertain. The 2026 elections offer a potential turning point—but only if they are genuinely free and fair, only if civic space opens rather than closes further, only if the transitional justice process moves from promise to reality. The international community has signaled its concerns and its willingness to support positive change. Whether Ethiopian authorities will respond remains to be seen.

What is certain is that the people of Oromia continue to suffer. Killings, abductions, rape, displacement, and fear shape daily life for millions . Children are out of school. Families are torn apart. Farmers cannot tend their fields. As one victim put it, caught between government and rebels: “You suffer because they say your family member is affiliated with the government or OLA” .

The path to a better future requires acknowledging this suffering, holding perpetrators accountable, addressing root causes, and building institutions—including customary courts—that can deliver justice with dignity. Whether Ethiopia’s leaders, and the international community, will rise to this challenge will determine not only the future of human rights in Oromia, but the future of Ethiopia itself.